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SWEET CAROLINE: THE BACKSLIDE FROM FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 613(b) TO THE RULE IN
QUEEN CAROLINE’S CASE
Katharine T. Schaffzin*
Since 1975, Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has governed the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement in federal court. Rule
613(b) requires the proponent of the prior inconsistent statement to provide the
declarant an opportunity to explain or deny it. There is no requirement that the
proponent provide that opportunity at any particular time or in any particular
sequence.
Rule 613 reflected a change from the common law that had fallen out of fashion in
the federal courts. That common law rule, known as the Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case, required the proponent of a prior inconsistent statement to confront the de-
clarant witness with the statement on cross-examination before introducing any
extrinsic evidence of the prior statement. For a variety of reasons, the Advisory
Committee reasoned that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case constituted an unnec-
essary encumbrance on cross-examination.
Despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b), and the clear explanation in the Advi-
sory Committee’s Note, a number of federal courts have continued to apply the
common law Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, citing assorted rationales for doing
so. Their actions have caught the attention of the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, which has entertained the idea of amending Rule 613(b) to reflect the com-
mon law Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.
All things considered, amending Rule 613(b) to adopt the common law of thirty-
five years ago is unwise. The English history behind the Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case undermines its credibility. Furthermore, Rule 613(b) accomplishes nearly all
of the legitimate policy goals of that common law rule while providing for more
effective cross-examination. While there does exist a split among United States
courts of appeals, most circuit courts apply Rule 613(b) as intended, and only a
minority of circuit courts apply the superseded Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.
Rather than amend Rule 613(b) to return to the common law Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case, the Advisory Committee should consider amending the Rule to
make uniform the application of the Rule as originally intended. At the very least,
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I can’t begin to knowin’
But then I know it’s growing strong. . . .
Sweet Caroline,
Good times never seemed so good. . . .
— Neil Diamond 1
To courts pining for a common law rule lost in federal practice
since before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
“[g]ood times never seemed so good” as when they could freely
apply the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case. Rule 613(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, however, intentionally superseded that
common law rule.2 For more than thirty years, the solution of a
minority of such nostalgic courts has been to apply the common law
rule despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b).3 The refusal of these
courts to recognize that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case is no
longer sound federal law has led the Advisory Committee on Evi-
dence Rules to reconsider if the drafters should have just codified
the common law rule in the first place.4 However, for the many
reasons explained below, that would be a mistake.
Since 1975, Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has
governed the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement in federal court.5 The easiest way to define extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement is to start with a description
of what it is not. When a cross-examiner questions a declarant wit-
ness directly about the witness’s own prior statement, extrinsic
evidence is not involved.6 For example, a cross-examiner asks a wit-
ness, “Didn’t you tell the responding officer that your assailant was
between 5’8” and 6’0”?” Such questions are permitted as direct evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement without limitation under
1. NEIL DIAMOND, Sweet Caroline, on SWEET CAROLINE (UNI Records 1969).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra note 157.
4. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, AGENDA BOOK 238–39 (April 3, 2012),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/
Evidence/EV2012-04.pdf.
5. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
6. See ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: IM-
PEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 5.6 (2012).
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Rule 613(a).7 When the cross-examiner moves beyond questioning
the declarant witness about the prior statement to proving the state-
ment with documentary evidence or calling another witness to
recount the declarant witness’s prior statement, extrinsic evidence
exists and triggers Rule 613(b).8 For example, the testimony of the
responding officer that the witness had in fact told him that the
assailant was between 5’8” and 6’0” is extrinsic evidence of the prior
statement.
Rule 613(b) requires the proponent of the prior inconsistent
statement to provide the declarant an opportunity to explain or
deny it.9 There is no requirement that the proponent provide that
opportunity at any particular time or in any particular sequence.10
The Rule further requires that opposing counsel receive a similar
opportunity to examine the declarant witness about the
statement.11
At the time the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules drafted
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 613 reflected a change from
the common law that had fallen out of fashion in the federal
courts.12 That common law rule, known as the Rule in Queen Caro-
line’s Case or the Rule in Queen’s Case,13 required the proponent
of a prior inconsistent statement to confront the declarant witness
with the statement on cross-examination before introducing any ex-
trinsic evidence of the prior statement.14 For a variety of reasons,
the Advisory Committee reasoned that the Rule in Queen Caro-
line’s Case constituted an unnecessary encumbrance on cross-
examination.15
Despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b) and the clear explana-
tion in the Advisory Committee’s Note,16 a number of federal courts
have continued to apply the common law Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case, citing assorted rationales for doing so.17 The actions of these
courts have caught the attention of the Advisory Committee on Evi-
dence Rules.18 That Committee has entertained the idea of
7. See FED. R. EVID. 613(a).
8. See PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
9. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
11. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
12. See infra note 72.
13. See Leonard J. Stern & Daniel F. Grosh, A Visit with Queen Caroline: Her Trial and Its
Rule, 6 CAP. U. L. REV. 165, 166 (1976).
14. See infra note 51.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
17. See infra Part III.B for an extended discussion of those decisions applying the Rule
in Queen Caroline’s Case after Congress enacted Rule 613(b).
18. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 4.
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amending Rule 613(b) to reflect the common law Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case.19
This Article considers the law governing the admission of extrin-
sic evidence and evaluates the need for amending Rule 613(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part I explains the history behind
the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case from its pronouncement in En-
glish Parliament in 1820, through its adoption in the United States,
to its modern application, and finally, to the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in 1975.20 Part II examines the application of
Rule 613.21 In Part III, the Article explains the split among United
States courts of appeals, in which most circuit courts apply Rule
613(b) as intended,22 and a minority of circuit courts apply the su-
perseded Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.23 Part IV suggests that,
rather than amend Rule 613(b) to return to the common law Rule
in Queen Caroline’s Case, the Advisory Committee should take no
action concerning the Rule. If the Advisory Committee feels com-
pelled to take action to make uniform the application of the Rule,
it should amend the Rule to promote its enforcement as originally
intended.24
I. OLD SCHOOL: THE RULE IN QUEEN CAROLINE’S CASE
The Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case arose in the House of Lords
in 1820 as a procedure devised in the monumental Parliamentary
pseudo-criminal divorce proceedings by which Queen Caroline’s
husband, King George IV, attempted to divest her of her title and
her rights.25 Historians Leonard Stern and Daniel Grosh described
the proceedings as “involv[ing] nothing more than the foolish and
scandalous personal lives of the most ridiculous royal couple in
British history.”26 The parliamentary mechanism used to divest the
Queen “was not even strictly a trial in the legal sense but rather a
dusty and archaic legal relic dating from the time of Henry VIII.”27
19. Id.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz & John Nicodemo, Impeachment Methods Illustrated: Mov-
ies, Novels, and High Profile Cases, 28 TOURO L. REV. 55, 80 (2012); Stern & Grosh, supra note
13, at 167.
26. Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 167.
27. Id.
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The divorce was quite a scandal at the time, as both parties, cous-
ins no less,28 apparently maintained many extramarital sexual
affairs.29 The King could not obtain a straightforward divorce from
the Queen under English law because, as Queen, she was not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law.30 Moreover, she
could easily defeat any action for divorce that he might have
brought in the ecclesiastical courts by filing a countercharge of
adultery.31 Instead, the King took a more creative route to rid him-
self of the Queen, using a tremendous amount of political capital to
introduce a “bill of pains and penalties” in Parliament that could be
passed by majority vote after three readings.32 The bill, if passed,
would strip the Queen of her title and divorce her from the King;
she could also be sentenced to death for high treason.33 A non-
traditional trial in Parliament accompanied the proceedings and
followed the rules of evidence and procedure of the ordinary law
courts.34
Prominently at issue during the trial was the character of the
Queen herself.35 During the trial, the Queen’s former chamber-
maid, Louisa Demonte, testified on behalf of the prosecution about
the Queen’s romantic adventures throughout Europe.36 On cross-
examination, one of Queen Caroline’s barristers, John Williams,
questioned Demonte about two earlier letters she had written
describing the Queen’s good character: one to her own sister in
which Demonte recounted the Queen’s good character and al-
luded to being bribed to testify against the Queen and another
letter to the Queen herself, requesting that the Queen hire her
back into service.37 Demonte’s statements in her letters describing
28. See id. at 169.
29. See Schwartz & Nicodemo, supra note 25, at 80.
30. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 185.
31. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 183–84. To obtain a divorce in England at the
time, a disenchanted spouse would first have to successfully petition the ecclesiastical court
for a judicial separation. Id. at 183. Next, he or she would need to initiate an action for
criminal conversation against his or her spouse, based on adultery, in the ordinary law courts
and win a judgment for damages. Id. Then, the injured spouse could petition Parliament to
pass an act dissolving the marriage. Id. Obviously, these steps came at great financial cost, a
problem easily overcome by the King. Id. His problem was that Queen Caroline could easily
defeat his claim in the ecclesiastical courts by countercharging adultery. See id. at 183–84.
32. See id. at 184–85.
33. See id. at 185. Infidelity to the King amounted to high treason. Id.
34. See id. at 187.
35. See id. at 189–90.
36. See id.; cf. Schwartz & Nicodemo, supra note 25, at 80 (quoting another source) (not-
ing that the Queen was described by one source as a “sensual wanderer”).
37. Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 190; see also Phillip W. Broadhead, Why Bias Is Never
Collateral: The Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 27 AM. J. TRIAL AD-
VOC. 235, 252 (2003).
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the Queen’s upstanding character contradicted her testimony on
direct examination.38
Two hours into Williams’s cross-examination of Demonte con-
cerning her prior inconsistent statements, the prosecutor objected
to the impeachment on the grounds that the best evidence of the
contents of the letters was the letters themselves, which Williams
had not yet introduced.39 While the court considered the propriety
of Williams’s cross-examination of Demonte, the Queen’s barristers
did not argue that to show the witness the extrinsic evidence before
confronting her with the letters would disable Williams’s ability to
effectively discredit her.40 Her Majesty’s barristers did not raise this
argument because Williams had already effectively discredited
Demonte for the two hours leading up to the court’s ruling that
Demonte was entitled to see the letters.41 As a result, the court did
not consider this argument before issuing its now infamous
ruling.42
The justices deliberated for only ten minutes and, relying on no
precedential authority, announced what would later be called the
Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, requiring a cross-examiner to show
or read aloud extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent
statement before questioning the witness about the inconsistency.43
After the court’s ruling, Williams showed Demonte the letters and
continued his cross-examination.44 At the conclusion of the trial
and upon the third reading in the House of Lords, the bill passed
by only a majority of nine.45 Concerned that his political gamble
had run out of steam, the King abandoned the bill before sending
it to the House of Commons.46 The Queen maintained both her
title and her marriage until her death.47 Shortly after the Rule in
38. See Broadhead, supra note 37, at 252; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 190.
39. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 191–93. It is true that the best evidence of the
letters’ contents were the letters themselves. In this case, however, this Best Evidence objec-
tion was inapplicable because the contents of the prior statements were not offered to prove
the truth of their substance but to impeach the witness’s credibility. Applying the Best Evi-
dence Rule in such a case would prevent an attorney from challenging a witness’s memory
concerning the letters without first refreshing that memory by disclosing the contents of the
letters. See id. at 198.
40. See id. at 191.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 197–98. The rule itself was only one of many rulings on evidence in the
course of the proceedings, and, for that reason, it has been confused with many of the other
rulings rendered during that trial, including the foundational requirements for authenticat-
ing documents and the Best Evidence Rule. Id. at 166–67.
44. See id. at 193.
45. Id. at 196. “[T]he final vote was only 108 in favor of the bill and 99 opposed. . . .” Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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Queen Caroline’s Case gained traction in the United States, En-
gland abandoned it in 1854.48
Although the Rule took hold in the United States in 1832, at first,
U.S. courts rejected opportunities to adopt the Rule in Queen Car-
oline’s Case.49 Courts in both Massachusetts and Maine rejected the
Rule because it was contrary to U.S. practice—as it had been con-
trary to English practice before the Queen’s trial—and because
concerns of fairness could be addressed without putting the witness
on notice of the prior inconsistent statement.50
As it was first adopted in the United States in 1832, the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case required the proponent of extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement to read or show the
statement to the witness before cross-examining him about the in-
consistency.51 Over the next ten years, many more states followed
suit,52 and once it was widely disseminated in a leading legal treatise
published in 1842, it gained universal acceptance in U.S. courts.53
Unfortunately, the rule explained in that treatise was much more
complex than the simple ruling of the court in Queen Caroline’s
trial.54 Instead of describing that simple rule, Simon Greenleaf, the
author of the preeminent evidentiary treatise of the time, incorpo-
rated several of the court’s rulings from that trial into one rule,
which combined became known in U.S. common law as the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case.55 In addition to requiring the cross-exam-
iner to read or show to the witness extrinsic evidence of a prior
48. See Broadhead, supra note 37, at 252; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 167 (citing
Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, § 24 (Eng.)).
49. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 200 (citing Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42 (1831);
Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 160 (1821)).
50. E.g., Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42 (1831); Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160 (16 Tyng) (1821);
see also Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 200.
51. Bellinger v. People, 8 Wend. 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (describing Queen Caro-
line’s Case as holding “that a witness could not, upon cross-examination, be asked whether,
in a certain letter (admitted to have been written by the witness, and in the hands of the party
putting the question) he did or did not make certain statements, or use certain expressions,
but that the letter itself must first be read before the cross-examination can be pursued; and
such is believed to be the established rule and practice in this state”); see also Schwartz &
Nicodemo, supra note 25, at 80; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 200.
52. E.g., Lewis v. Post & Main, 1 Ala. 65 (1840); Doe ex rel. Sutton v. Reagan, 5 Blackf.
217 (Ind. 1839); Franklin Bank of Balt. v. Pa., Del., & Md. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28
(Md. 1839); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1 Walker 48 (Mich. Ch. 1842); Garret v. State, 6 Mo. 1 (1839);
Sharp v. Emmet, 5 Whart. 288 (Pa. 1840); Pierce v. Gilson, 9 Vt. 216 (1837); see also Stern &
Grosh, supra note 13, at 200.
53. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 201 (crediting Simon Greenleaf with cementing
the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case into the common law of the United States by including
the rule in his treatise).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 199–200.
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inconsistent statement before questioning her about the inconsis-
tency, the rule Greenleaf laid out also required the proponent to
lay a specific foundation before the introduction of that state-
ment.56 As Greenleaf’s formulation spread, the U.S. common law
surrounding the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case also grew to re-
quire the cross-examiner to describe the substance of the
statement, to identify the time and place of the statement, and to
list the people present when the statement was made.57 This partic-
ular aspect of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case is often referred
to as the “prior foundation” requirement.
The reasons for adopting the rule in the United States were nu-
merous. They included: (1) preventing unfair surprise and
embarrassment to the declarant witness by allowing her the oppor-
tunity to deny having made the prior statement;58 (2) requiring
production of the original statement;59 (3) promoting efficiency by
allowing the declarant witness to admit to the inconsistency, thus
obviating the need for the introduction of the prior inconsistent
statement (rendering it cumulative under Rule 403);60 and (4)
highlighting, through juxtaposition, that a prior inconsistent state-
ment is generally admissible for impeachment only and not as
substantive evidence.61
The downside of such a foundation is that it requires an attorney
to show his hand to both opposing counsel and the witness:
[I]f the rule in the Queen’s Case is followed, and it is required
that the witness first be shown or read the letter, this valuable
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., PARK & LININGER, supra note 6; 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6205 (2d ed. 2012); Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 200.
58. See PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
59. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 198. This is essentially an argument in favor of
the Best Evidence Rule, Rule 1002 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires produc-
tion of the original “writing, recording, or photograph” to prove the contents of the writing,
recording, or photograph. When introducing extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment, however, the purpose is to prove the lack of witness credibility rather than to prove the
contents of the statement itself. See id. Thus, the Best Evidence Rule is not appropriately
included in a discussion of Rule 613(b). See id.
60. See, e.g., PARK & LININGER, supra note 6; Broadhead, supra note 37, at 253–54.
61. See PARK & LININGER, supra note 6. A prior inconsistent statement is hearsay if it is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). To get past the rule
against hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 802, the proponent of a prior inconsistent statement must
concede that it is not admissible as substantive evidence. See ANTHONY J. BOCCHINO & DAVID
A. SONENSHEIN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL EVIDENCE: OBJECTIONS, RESPONSES, RULES,
AND PRACTICE COMMENTARY 143 (10th ed. 2011). Typically, a court admitting extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement will provide a limiting instruction to the jury
explaining that the evidence is being admitted to reflect on the credibility of the witness and
that the jury should not consider it as proof that the content of the statement is true.
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chance to test his memory and veracity is lost. A forgetful wit-
ness will have his memory of the letter refreshed or corrected,
though his memory for the rest of his testimony remains
faulty. A lying witness will discover the matters on which he
may safely lie and those on which he must equivocate, thus
guarding the lie from discovery.62
The Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, then, allows the witness the
opportunity to conform her testimony to the prior statement in or-
der to obfuscate the inconsistency.63
As the English had since rejected the Rule in 1854,64 several U.S.
jurists and legal scholars agreed that U.S. courts should similarly
abandon the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case because they decried it
as an unnecessary impediment to effective cross-examination.65 Pro-
fessor John Henry Wigmore stated in his treatise in 1904 that, “In
the year 1820 an English decision laid down a rule which for un-
soundness of principle, impropriety of policy, and practical
inconvenience in trials committed the most notable mistake that
can be found among the rulings upon the present subject.”66 An-
other scholar noted, “For Wigmore, cross-examination was the
great legal weapon for truth, and the Rule in the Queen’s Case was
an insuperable barrier to the most telling use of cross-
examination.”67
Nonetheless, the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case had already
taken root in U.S. common law.68 Although some form of the Rule
remains in at least fourteen states,69 Rule 613 of the Federal Rules
62. Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 198.
63. See PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
64. Norman B. Miller, Our Witness: Testimony at Trial, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 555, 575 &
n.64 (1977).
65. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 167 (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1259 (Chadbourn rev., 1972); United States v. Dillard, 101 F.2d
829, 837 (2d Cir. 1938)) (recounting the criticisms of Dean Wigmore and Judge Learned
Hand).
66. Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 202 (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1259 (Chadbourn rev., 1972)).
67. Id.; see also id. at 167 (quoting United States v. Dillard, 101 F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir.
1938)) (“Yet the rule survived as law for over 150 years in this country, despite the withering
scorn of such legal giants as Dean Wigmore. . . . Judge Learned Hand once observed that it
‘is everywhere more honored in the breach than in the observance.’”).
68. See Broadhead, supra note 37, at 252; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 201–02.
69. The following states have codified the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case: ALASKA R.
EVID. 613(b); COLO. R. EVID. 613; CONN. R. EVID. § 6-10; FLA. STAT. § 90.614 (2012); HAW. R.
EVID. 613; KY. R. EVID. 613; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 613 (2006); MD. R. 5-613; MINN. R. EVID.
613(b); OHIO R. EVID. 613; PA. R. EVID. 613; TENN. R. EVID. 613; TEX. R. EVID. 613; WASH. R.
EVID. 613.
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of Evidence superseded it in federal courts when the Evidence
Rules were adopted in 1975.70
II. MODERN RULE: RULE 613
To evaluate the propriety of amending Rule 613 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to incorporate the Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case, as that Rule was applied at U.S. common law, it is necessary to
identify the differences between Rule 613 and the Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules first
proposed the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969, and Congress fi-
nally adopted them in 1975.71 By that time, the Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case had fallen out of favor in federal practice.72 To that
end, the Advisory Committee intentionally omitted the common
law rule from Rule 613.73
Rule 613 is broken down into two parts, as follows:
Rule 613. Witness’s Prior Statement
(a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination.
When examining a witness about the witness’s prior state-
ment, a party need not show it or disclose its contents to
the witness. But the party must, on request, show it or dis-
close its contents to an adverse party’s attorney.
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Ex-
trinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement
is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to
explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is
given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if
justice so requires. This subdivision (b) does not apply to
an opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2).74
Rule 613(a) relates to examining a witness directly about his or her
own written or oral prior inconsistent statement. Rule 613(b) fo-
cuses on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of those prior
statements.
70. See FED. R. EVID. 613.
71. See Eileen A. Scallen, Proceeding with Caution: Making and Amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 601, 608–09 (2008).
72. See 1 Michael H. Graham, WINNING EVIDENCE ARGUMENTS: ADVANCED EVIDENCE FOR
THE TRIAL ATTORNEY § 613:1 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
73. FED. R. EVID. 613(a)–(b) advisory committee’s note.
74. FED. R. EVID. 613.
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A. Rule 613(a)
Rule 613(a) did away with the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case as
it relates to questioning a witness about his or her own statement.75
Under Rule 613(a), a cross-examiner may question a witness di-
rectly about his or her own prior inconsistent statement without
ever disclosing the content of the prior inconsistent statement.76
Out of fairness, however, the cross-examiner must disclose the con-
tents of the prior inconsistent statement to opposing counsel upon
request.77
Take, for example, a simple car accident in which the driving
conditions are a central issue in the case. Paula Plaintiff alleges that
Darrell Defendant rear-ended her Pontiac at a stop sign with his
Dodge Dart. On direct examination, Paula Plaintiff testified that
there was full sun on the well-lit intersection at the time of the acci-
dent and that the road was dry. Pursuant to Rule 613(a), defense
counsel could cross-examine Paula as follows:
Q: It’s your testimony today that the intersection was lit by
full sun at the time of the accident?
A: Yes.
Q: And that the road was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: You are certain that there was full sun?
A: Yes.
Q: And you are certain that the road surface was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: But, that’s not what you told Mr. Thompson, the insur-
ance adjuster assigned to your case, is it?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: You told Mr. Thompson that the road was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: And you told Mr. Thompson there was full sun?
A: Yes.
Pursuant to Rule 613(a), there is no need for defense counsel to
put Paula Plaintiff on notice as to what she said to Mr. Thompson
and the context in which she said it. The cross-examiner can allow
75. FED. R. EVID. 613(a) advisory committee’s note (Rule 613(a) “abolishes this useless
impediment to cross-examination”); see also, e.g., 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 26.20 (7th ed. 2000); GRAHAM, supra note 72; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 57; Schwartz & Nicodemo, supra note 25, at 80.
76. FED. R. EVID. 613(a).
77. Id.
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the witness enough rope with which to hang herself and only then
choose to introduce Mr. Thompson’s record of the conversation,
which may be inconsistent with Paula’s trial testimony. Defense
counsel is, nonetheless, required to provide a copy of any written
statement to Paula’s attorney upon her request.
B. Rule 613(b)
As adopted in 1975 and in its current restyled form, Rule 613(b)
officially removed the requirement of a prior foundation for the
admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.
Most notably, Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement that the wit-
ness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency
before a court admits extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment.78 Additionally, a cross-examiner is no longer required to
describe the substance of the prior inconsistent statement to the
declarant witness, the time and place the statement was made, or
the individuals present at the time the statement was made before
introducing extrinsic evidence of the statement.79 Instead, all that is
required is that the impeaching attorney give the declarant witness
an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and that opposing
counsel receive the opportunity to examine the witness on this sub-
ject.80 Notably, the majority of federal circuit courts do not require
the cross-examiner to call the declarant witness and pose the ques-
tions prompting the explanation or denial of the prior inconsistent
statement; the Rule is satisfied as long as opposing counsel has the
opportunity to do so.81
The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 613(b) is quite clear that
the timing for laying the foundation is irrelevant; extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible whether the propo-
nent lays the foundation before or after introducing the
inconsistent statement.82 The Note specifies: “The traditional insis-
tence that the attention of the witness be directed to the statement
78. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; GRAHAM, supra note 72; PARK & LININGER, supra note
6; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57.
79. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57.
80. See id.
81. See id. For a detailed discussion of who has the burden of providing the declarant an
opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistent statement under Rule 613(b), see infra notes
203–05 and accompanying text.
82. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note. Furthermore, “[u]nder this proce-
dure, several collusive witnesses can be examined before disclosure of a joint prior
inconsistent statement.” Id.
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on cross-examination is relaxed in favor of simply providing the wit-
ness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an
opportunity to examine on the statement, with no specification of
any particular time or sequence.”83 Therefore, Rule 613(b) explic-
itly eliminated the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case.84
Additionally, the Advisory Committee’s Note contemplates that
courts will use their discretion to admit, rather than exclude, extrin-
sic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the
foundational requirements of Rule 613 cannot be satisfied.85 That
Note states, “In order to allow for such eventualities as the witness
becoming unavailable by the time the statement is discovered, a
measure of discretion is conferred upon the judge.”86 That the dis-
cretion the Advisory Committee referenced is the discretion to
admit, rather than to exclude, such evidence is apparent from its
cross-reference to California Evidence Code § 770.87 The Advisory
Committee’s Note to California Evidence Code § 770 states,
“Where the interests of justice require it, the court may permit ex-
trinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement to be admitted even
though the witness has been excused and has had no opportunity
to explain or deny the statement.”88 The Rule contemplates no dis-
cretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement, such as might justify exclusion of such evidence intro-
duced before the proponent allows the witness to explain or deny
the inconsistency, but after the court has excused the otherwise
available witness.89
Because Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement that such a
foundation be laid prior to the admission of extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement, as had been required under the com-
mon law Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, the impeaching attorney
has two options for impeaching a witness under 613(b).90 First, the
cross-examiner may lay the traditional foundation from Queen Car-
oline’s Case by providing the declarant witness the opportunity to
deny the prior inconsistent statement during cross-examination.91
83. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
84. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; GRAHAM, supra note 72; PARK & LININGER, supra note
6; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57.
85. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CAL. EVID. CODE § 770 law revision commission comments (West 2013).
89. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
90. See, e.g., PARK & LININGER, supra note 6; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57; Broadhead,
supra note 37, at 252.
91. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57.
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Then, the cross-examiner may introduce the prior inconsistent
statement. This will then trigger the opportunity for the witness to
explain the statement on redirect.
Returning to the car accident between Paula Plaintiff and Darrell
Defendant, the first option would play out as follows, in keeping
with the Rule in Queen Caroline’s case:
Q: It’s your testimony today that the intersection was lit by
full sun at the time of the accident?
A: Yes.
Q: And that the road was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: You are certain that there was full sun?
A: Yes.
Q: And you are certain that the road surface was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: You remember calling your insurance agent after the acci-
dent, don’t you?
A: Yes.
Q: And he assigned Mr. Thompson to act as the adjuster in
your case?
A: Yes.
Q: And you spoke with Mr. Thompson on August 20, did you
not?
A: Yes.
Q: Just three days after the accident?
A: Yes.
Q: But, you told Mr. Thompson that the sky was dark at the
time of the accident, didn’t you?
A: No.
Q: You also told Mr. Thompson that it had begun to sleet
minutes before the accident?
A: No.
Q: And you told Mr. Thompson that the road had started to
become slick moments before the accident, isn’t that
right?
A: No.
(After excusing the witness and calling Mr. Thompson)
Q: Mr. Thompson, did Paula Plaintiff speak to you about the
accident?
A: Yes.
Q: What did she say?
A: She told me that the sky was dark at the time of the acci-
dent and it had just begun to sleet.
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Q: Did she say anything about the condition of the road?
A: Yes. She told me that the road had become slick.
Because defense counsel gave Paula the opportunity to admit or
deny having made the statement to Mr. Thompson before introduc-
ing extrinsic evidence of that inconsistency, both Rule 613(b) and
the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case are accommodated.
Rule 613(b), however, offers an alternative to this first method,
which leaves the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case by the wayside. This
second option allows the cross-examiner to highlight in-court testi-
mony to set it up for juxtaposition with the prior inconsistent
statement without ever mentioning the prior statement.92 Then, the
cross-examiner can introduce the extrinsic evidence.93 Finally, op-
posing counsel can recall the declarant witness to provide the
opportunity to deny the statement.94
Using the example of Paula Plaintiff’s cross-examination once
again, the second option would unfold as follows:
Q: It’s your testimony today that the intersection was lit by
full sun at the time of the accident?
A: Yes.
Q: And that the road was dry?
A: Yes.
Q: You are certain that there was full sun?
A: Yes.
Q: And you are certain that the road surface was dry?
A: Yes.
(After excusing the witness and calling Mr. Thompson)
Q: Mr. Thompson, did Paula Plaintiff speak to you about the
accident?
A: Yes.
Q: What did she say?
A: She told me that the sky was dark at the time of the acci-
dent and it had just begun to sleet.
Q: Did she say anything about the condition of the road?
A: Yes. She told me that the road had become slick.
(After recalling the declarant witness)
Q: You spoke with Mr. Thompson on August 20, did you not?
A: Yes.
Q: Just three days after the accident?
92. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57.
93. Id.
94. See PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
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A: Yes.
Q: You told him that, when you approached the intersection,
the sky was dark and had begun to sleet, didn’t you?
A: No.
Q: You told him that the road had become slick?
A: No.
This method is wholly appropriate under Rule 613(b), but it would
violate the common law Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case because de-
fense counsel did not give Paula Plaintiff the opportunity to explain
or deny the prior inconsistent statement before introducing extrin-
sic proof of that prior statement. Defense counsel did not put Paula
on notice that he had any such extrinsic evidence, leaving her with
just enough rope to hang herself during her initial cross-examina-
tion. She learned of the existence of extrinsic evidence of her prior
inconsistent statement at the same time that the jury did, making it
more difficult for her to deny the inconsistency.
C. The Role of the Advisory Committee
The Advisory Committee chose not to codify the Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case in Rule 613 for several reasons. First, the time saved
by allowing the declarant witness to admit or deny the statement
before confronting her with extrinsic evidence of the prior incon-
sistent statement was minimal, significantly undercutting the oft-
cited reason justifying the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.95 Second,
a requirement that an impeaching attorney disclose the contents of
a prior inconsistent statement to opposing counsel satisfies the con-
cern for preventing unfair surprise to opposing counsel.96 Third, a
requirement that the proponent of the evidence provide the wit-
ness an opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent statement,
either before or after the admission of extrinsic evidence of the wit-
ness’s prior inconsistent statement, addresses the concern for
fairness to the declarant witness.97
95. See, e.g., PARK & LININGER, supra note 6; Broadhead, supra note 37, at 253-54.
96. See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 255 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Rules of Evi-
dence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973) (statement of Edward W. Cleary, Re-
porter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
97. See id. (quoting Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973)
(statement of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
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These reasons are compounded by the questionable policy be-
hind the initial adoption of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case and
the swiftness with which England dispensed with its newly created
rule, as discussed in Part I of this Article.98 Additionally, at the time
it was first adopted, the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case represented
a departure from U.S. common law; it was initially rejected by sev-
eral jurisdictions99 before being adopted by New York100 and
eventually other state and federal courts. Moreover, the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case was no longer even followed in federal prac-
tice by 1969 when the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted.101
Finally, the common law rule denied the jury the significant ben-
efit of assessing the declarant’s credibility without forewarning the
declarant witness that she may be backing herself into a corner.102
John Henry Wigmore himself vehemently criticized the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case for impeding the abilities of a cross-exam-
iner. Wigmore extolled, as scholar Tom Lininger put it, the art of
cross-examination as “our greatest invention for truth-seeking.”103
Professor Lininger noted that “Cross-examination is the purest ex-
pression of our adversarial process. It is the highlight of the trial for
both jurors and lawyers. It is the moment in litigation when the best
lawyers distinguish themselves.”104
The recent Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington105
affirmed the importance of cross-examination. In that case, the
Court explained that “the vital importance of the rule securing the
right of cross-examination” has been “burned into the general con-
sciousness.”106 According to Professor Lininger:
Justice Scalia [in Crawford] lauded cross-examination as our
best tool for testing the veracity of witnesses. Yet cross-exami-
nation is not simply a means to an end, wrote Justice Scalia. It
is an end in itself. There may be other possible methods of
98. See supra Part I for further discussion of the initial adoption of the Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case.
99. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 200 (citing Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42 (1831);
Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 160 (1821)).
100. Bellinger v. People, 8 Wend. 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832).
101. See GRAHAM, supra note 72.
102. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 198.
103. Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2005) (citations
omitted).
104. Id.
105. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
106. Lininger, supra note 103, at 1354 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46).
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ascertaining truth, but they cannot supplant cross-examina-
tion. Indeed, in a criminal trial, a defendant’s right to cross-
examination is no less sacred than his right to a jury trial.107
In drafting Rule 613(b), the Advisory Committee had determined
that the costs of impeding cross-examination outweighed the bene-
fits of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT: COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS
OF RULE 613(b)
It is clear that the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules in-
tended Rule 613(b) to eliminate any prior foundation requirement
that existed at common law attributable to the Rule in Queen Caro-
line’s Case.108 Moreover, the Advisory Committee intended that, if
courts would exercise any discretion in applying Rule 613(b), that
discretion would favor the admission, rather than exclusion, of ex-
trinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements.109 Nonetheless, a
number of U.S. courts of appeals have affirmed decisions of federal
district courts excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement where the impeaching party failed to lay a prior founda-
tion.110 Those courts have distinguished themselves from the U.S.
courts of appeals that have consistently applied Rule 613(b) without
imposing a prior foundation requirement as the Advisory Commit-
tee originally intended.111 Over the past thirty-five years, a circuit
split has developed.112
107. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62).
108. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
110. See infra note 157.
111. See infra note 113.
112. The following U.S. courts of appeals apply Rule 613(b) to allow admission of extrin-
sic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the proponent of the statement did not
lay a prior foundation during cross-examination, but the declarant witness remained availa-
ble for recall by opposing counsel: First Circuit, United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 956
(1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 254–56 (1st Cir. 1976); Fifth Circuit,
Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1986); Sixth Circuit, United States
v. McCall, 85 F.3d 1193, 1197 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204
(6th Cir. 1984); Seventh Circuit, United States v. Della Rose, 403 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir.
2005); United States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207, 1210–11 (7th Cir. 1987); Ninth Circuit, United
States v. Young, 86 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 1996); and Eleventh Circuit, Wammock v. Celotex
Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1521–22 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming exclusion of prior inconsistent
statement but only because witness was not available for recall to explain or deny the state-
ment after being excused from cross-examination). Notably, the Seventh Circuit also decided
United States v. Elliott, 771 F.2d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring prior foundation with-
out providing any explanation for deviating from precedent), which is an aberration among
the other precedent in that Circuit.
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A. The Majority View: Rule 613(b) Does not Require a Prior Foundation
The majority of U.S. courts of appeals apply Rule 613(b) pursu-
ant to its plain meaning and to the meaning prescribed by the
Advisory Committee’s Note—namely, without imposing a prior
foundation requirement.113 However, these appellate courts often
note that they do not condone the practice of “sandbagging”114 to
introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.115
The following U.S. courts of appeals require a prior foundation even where the declarant
is available for recall by either party: Second Circuit, United States v. DiNapoli, 557 F.2d 962,
965 (2d Cir. 1977); Fourth Circuit, U.S. v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1975); Eighth
Circuit, United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 571–72 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 733 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th
Cir. 1994); and Tenth Circuit, United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has a unique interpretation of Rule 613(b),
which does not require a prior foundation as long as the witness is not only available for
recall to explain or deny the statement, but where the proponent of the statement takes
advantage of that opportunity and recalls the witness. E.g., United States v. Green, 556 F.3d
151, 158 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Stewart, 179 F. App’x 814, 821–22 (3d Cir. 2006);
United States v. DeLaurentis, 47 F. App’x 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing DiNapoli, 557 F.2d at
965).
113. E.g., Della Rose, 403 F.3d at 903 (determining extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statement should have been admitted although impeaching party failed to confront witness
with inconsistency on cross-examination); United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 781–82 (8th
Cir. 1998) (affirming trial court’s admission of prior inconsistent statement after witness’s
cross-examination where court allowed recall of the witness in surrebuttal as “consistent with
the plain language of Rule 613(b)”); Young, 86 F.3d at 949 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement where witness was not confronted
on cross-examination but witness was available for recall); McCall, 85 F.3d at 1197 (finding
extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement admissible even after cross-examination
where witness is available for recall); Hudson, 970 F.2d at 956 (finding that court should have
admitted extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement although impeaching party did
not confront witness with inconsistency during cross-examination); Theriot, 783 F.2d at 533
(permitting introduction of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement before con-
fronting witness with inconsistency later in same cross-examination); McGuire, 744 F.2d at
1204 (ruling extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement was admissible although it was
not introduced until after declarant witness was excused because he was available for recall
on rebuttal); Barrett, 539 F.2d at 254–56 (where there is no demonstration of witness’s un-
availability for recall, extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement is admissible even
after cross-examination).
114. “Sandbagging” is the ill-received practice of cross-examining a witness with full
knowledge of the witness’s prior inconsistent statement, making no reference to such state-
ment during the cross-examination, then raising the prior statement for the first time when
the proponent of the statement may next call witnesses. See FISHMAN, supra note 75.
115. See, e.g., McCall, 85 F.3d at 1197 (quoting McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204); McGuire, 744
F.2d at 1204 (“We do not approve of the government’s not informing the defendants of this
evidence [of a prior inconsistent statement], which we view as a questionable trial tactic. . . .
In any event, the prosecution should have confronted the witness with this statement. De-
fendants, however, were offered the opportunity to call surrebuttal witnesses.”); Barrett, 539
F.2d at 255–56 (“[W]hile good practice still calls for the laying of a foundation, one is not
absolutely required. It would have been desirable for defense counsel to have asked [the
witness] on cross-examination if he had made the purported statement. . . .”).
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Despite this concern about sandbagging, these courts have com-
plied with Rule 613(b). Where the witness remained available for
recall, courts have admitted evidence of a witness’s prior inconsis-
tent statements that the proponent introduced after the court had
excused the witness.116 In fact, a witness’s availability for recall has
been central to courts’ decisions to follow Rule 613(b) and not en-
force the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in Queen
Caroline’s Case.117
In one of the earliest federal appellate cases applying the newly
adopted Rule 613(b), United States v. Barrett, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision to
exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.118 A
jury had convicted Arthur Barrett for stealing and reselling a mu-
seum’s collection of postage stamps.119 A key witness at trial was
Buzzy Adams, who testified on direct examination for the govern-
ment concerning a conversation between Adams and Barrett in
October 1974.120 According to Adams’s testimony, Barrett admitted
to Adams that he had committed the crimes alleged.121 During its
cross-examination of Adams, the defense did not question Adams
about an earlier statement that he made to Thomas Delaney in No-
vember 1974, which Jeanne Kelley overheard, to the effect that
Barrett had nothing to do with the crime.122 In its case-in-chief, the
defense attempted to call Delaney and Kelley to provide extrinsic
evidence of Adams’s prior inconsistent statement.123 The trial court,
however, excluded the testimony of Delaney and Kelley upon objec-
tion by the government, ruling that the defense had failed to lay a
prior foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement during its cross-examination of Adams.124
The First Circuit found that the trial court erred in so ruling.125 It
recognized that the common law that developed from the Rule in
116. See, e.g., Della Rose, 403 F.3d at 903 (“But the rule itself says only that the witness must
have the opportunity to explain or deny his prior statement; it does not say that he must be
given that opportunity before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admitted. . . . [T]he gov-
ernment could have brought [the witness] back to the stand in its rebuttal case and asked
him about the statement at that time.”); Moore, 149 F.3d at 781; Young, 86 F.3d at 949; McCall,
85 F.3d at 1197; Hudson, 970 F.2d at 956; McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204; Barrett, 539 F.2d at
254–56.
117. See supra note 116.
118. 539 F.2d at 254–56.
119. Id. at 245.
120. Id. at 254 n.9.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 254.
123. Id. at 253–54.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 254–55.
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Queen Caroline’s Case would have required defense counsel to “lay
a foundation for introducing extrinsic evidence of the statement by
first directing Adams’[s] attention to the occasion of the alleged
contradictory statement and asking him if he made it.”126 Nonethe-
less, the court continued, “It is clear . . . that Fed. R. Evid. 613(b)
has relaxed any absolute requirement that this practice be ob-
served, only requiring instead that the witness be afforded at some
time an opportunity to explain or deny, and for further interroga-
tion.”127 The court further held that this requirement of providing
the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency was
satisfied even if the witness was never actually confronted with the
prior inconsistent statement, as long as the witness was available for
recall, whether or not opposing counsel took advantage of the abil-
ity to recall the witness.128
In support of its position, the court relied on the testimony of the
Reporter of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States.129 The Reporter ex-
plained the objectives of the prior foundation requirement of the
Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case as threefold:
(1) to save time, since the witness may admit having made the
statement and thus make the extrinsic proof unnecessary; (2)
to avoid unfair surprise to the opposite party by affording him
an opportunity to draw a denial or explanation from the wit-
ness; and (3) to give the witness himself, in fairness, a chance
to deny or to explain the apparent discrepancy.130
The Reporter, however, noted that the first of these objectives was
insignificant, stating, “[T]he time saved is not great; the laying of
the foundation may inadvertently have been overlooked; the im-
peaching statement may not have been discovered until later; and
126. Id. at 254.
127. Id. at 254–55.
128. Id. at 255–56; see also, e.g., U.S. v. Della Rose, 403 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2005); U.S.
v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984).
129. Barrett, 539 F.2d at 255.
130. Id. (quoting Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973) (state-
ment of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
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premature disclosure may on occasion frustrate the effective im-
peachment of a collusive witness.”131 The First Circuit adopted the
Reporter’s reasoning that the last two objectives could be equally
achieved under Rule 613(b) as under the common law, as long as
the witness was given the opportunity to explain or deny the incon-
sistency at some point during the trial.132 The First Circuit also
considered that trial courts have discretion to admit an unavailable
witness’s impeaching statement if the “interests of justice . . . war-
rant dispensing entirely with the opportunity to explain or deny.”133
Ultimately, the First Circuit determined that the trial court erred
in excluding the testimony of Delaney and Kelley.134 It relied on the
fact that the government could have recalled Adams to explain or
deny the alleged inconsistency after Delaney and Kelley offered ex-
trinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement.135 The court
noted that “the [district] court dismissed the evidence out of hand
and made no inquiry into Adams’[s] availability.”136 If Adams could
have been recalled, the government could have given him the op-
portunity to explain or deny the inconsistency in satisfaction of
Rule 613(b).
In United States v. McGuire, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit found no error in the trial court’s admission of
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement after the witness
had been excused.137 That case involved the criminal trial of Leo
McGuire, the President and CEO of the First National Bank of
Grayson, surrounding the fraudulent use of funds from the Ken-
tucky Housing Corporation’s Loans to Lenders Program intended
to provide low interest mortgages to low income Kentuckians.138
During the trial, the defense presented the testimony of W.H.
Dysard concerning the defendant’s good faith use of the funds in
131. Id. (quoting Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973) (state-
ment of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
132. See id. (quoting Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973)
(statement of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
133. Id. (quoting Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973) (state-
ment of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
134. Id. at 256.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1199.
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question.139 Dysard testified on direct examination that he first
learned of the grand jury investigation in October 1980, but that he
had been aware of an ongoing investigation before that point.140
The government did not confront Dysard with any prior inconsis-
tent statement during cross-examination, and he was excused.141 In
its rebuttal case, the government called FBI Agent Goode to testify
that, on November 19, 1980, Dysard told him that he had “just be-
come aware of the ‘situation’” and that he had no additional
knowledge about any investigation.142
The Sixth Circuit recognized that, under the common law, the
government would have been required to confront Dysard with the
prior inconsistent statement during cross-examination.143 It further
recognized that Rule 613(b) contains no such requirement of a
prior foundation.144 Since the defendants were offered the chance
to call Dysard in surrebuttal, however, the court found that the op-
portunity to admit or deny the statement, as contemplated by Rule
613(b), had been satisfied.145 The court noted that “[h]ad this
point been of great importance, they would have made arrange-
ments to return Dysard to the stand but they did not do so.”146
In United States v. Della Rose, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reached a similar result.147 In that case, attorney
Steven Della Rose was convicted on charges stemming from seeking
to obtain a false identification card in the name of a client to en-
able Della Rose’s employee, Dennis Ilenfeld, to cash a settlement
check in the client’s name on behalf of Della Rose.148 During the
trial, Richard Britz, a former client of Della Rose, testified for the
government that Della Rose had arranged for him to obtain a false
identification card after his driver’s license was suspended.149 On
cross-examination, the defense did not question Britz about any
prior inconsistent statements.150 The trial court later excluded
Frank DeFrancesco’s testimony that Britz procured his false identifi-
cation from Ilenfeld, not Della Rose.151
139. Id. at 1203.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1203–04.





147. 403 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2005).
148. Id. at 894.
149. Id. at 899.
150. Id. at 903.
151. Id. at 900.
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The Seventh Circuit reversed and noted that Rule 613(b) “says
only that the witness must have the opportunity to explain or deny
his prior statement; it does not say that he must be given that op-
portunity before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admitted.”152
The court continued, “[T]he fact that Britz had not been asked
about his statement to DeFrancesco on cross-examination did not
necessarily preclude the defense from eliciting testimony from
DeFrancesco about the statement; the government could have
brought Britz back to the stand in its rebuttal case and asked him
about the statement at that time.”153
The reasoning in Barrett, McGuire, and Della Rose is common to
those cases applying Rule 613(b) as written.154 It is consistent with
the plain meaning of the Rule, which imposes no time constraint or
sequence in introducing prior inconsistent statements.155 Moreover,
this interpretation is consistent with the Advisory Committee’s
Note.156 The majority of courts of appeals, thus, honor both the
letter and intent of the Rule.
B. The Minority View: Long Live Queen Caroline!
Despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b), four U.S. courts of
appeals have affirmed district court decisions excluding prior in-
consistent statements where the proponent of the statement failed
to lay a prior foundation.157 No circuit is more frequently cited for
152. Id. at 903.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 113.
155. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
156. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note.
157. E.g., United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 571–72 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming trial
court’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement where witness had not
been confronted on cross-examination, although he was available for recall); United States v.
Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 733 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Rule 613(b) allows impeachment by prior in-
consistent statement only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to explain the
statement.”); United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing as
“proper” the requirement of an opportunity for the declarant witness to explain or deny a
prior inconsistent statement during cross-examination); United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d
948, 956 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992) (maintaining rule that Rule 613(b) does not require prior oppor-
tunity to explain or deny, but noting that Rule 611(a) does give trial courts discretion to
require prior foundation “when such an approach seems fitting”); United States v. Bonnett,
877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that, under Rule 613(b), “before a prior incon-
sistent statement may be introduced, the party making the statement must be given the
opportunity to explain or deny the same”); United States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207, 1210–11
(7th Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statement to avoid jury confusion); United States v. Elliott, 771 F.2d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir.
1985) (affirming exclusion of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement where de-
clarant had not been confronted with inconsistency on cross-examination); United States v.
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the proposition that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment should be excluded if the witness is not confronted with the
inconsistency on cross-examination than the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.158 The Eighth Circuit’s 2003 decision in
United States v. Schnapp159 is representative of the reasoning for im-
posing the traditions of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case despite
the plain meaning of Rule 613(b).160
In Schnapp, Christopher Schnapp appealed his arson convic-
tion.161 During the trial, the government presented the testimony of
Jim Schuhmacher, an investigator with the local prosecutor’s office,
stating that the fire originated on the floor of the furnace room and
was deliberately set.162 Defense counsel did not question Schuh-
macher about a prior inconsistent statement during his cross-
examination.163 On the direct examination of Schnapp, however,
defense counsel attempted to question him about a conversation
between Schuhmacher and Schnapp immediately after the fire.164
DiNapoli, 557 F.2d 962, 965 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming decision of trial court refusing to allow
recall of witness to provide opportunity to explain or deny extrinsic evidence of bias); United
States v. Alvarez, No. 91 CR 279-5, 1991 WL 259008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1991) (citing
Marks as requiring impeaching party to first show extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statement to witness to prevent jury confusion); see also, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; PARK &
LININGER, supra note 6 (finding that the trial court has discretion under Rule 611(a), as well
as the Advisory Committee Note, to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment where the prior foundation was not laid); WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57 (“[W]here
the potential costs of abandoning the traditional approach are high, the courts and commen-
tators conclude there is power under Rule 611(a) to require the impeaching party to adhere
to the traditional approach or risk exclusion of the prior inconsistent statement under Rule
403.” (citations omitted)).
158. See, e.g., Schnapp, 322 F.3d at 571–72 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent statement where witness had not been confronted on cross,
although he was available for recall); Dierling, 131 F.3d at 733 (“Rule 613(b) allows impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statement only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to
explain the statement.”); Sutton, 41 F.3d at 1260 (describing as “proper” the act of giving the
declarant witness the opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent statement during
cross). But see United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 781–82 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial
court’s admission of prior inconsistent statement after witness’s cross-examination where
court allowed recall of the witness in surrebuttal as “consistent with the plain language of
Rule 613(b)”).
159. 322 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2003).
160. See, e.g., Sutton, 41 F.3d at 1260 (demanding that the declarant witness receive an
opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent statement during cross and before the
admission of extrinsic evidence); Elliott, 771 F.2d at 1050 (affirming exclusion of extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the declarant had not been confronted with
the inconsistency on cross-examination); DiNapoli, 557 F.2d at 965 (affirming decision of trial
court refusing to allow recall of witness to provide opportunity to explain or deny extrinsic
evidence of bias).
161. Schnapp, 322 F.3d at 565.
162. Id. at 566–67.
163. Id. at 569.
164. Id.
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The trial court excluded this line of questioning on the govern-
ment’s objection because the defense had failed to first confront
Schuhmacher with his prior inconsistent statement on cross-exami-
nation.165 The defense made an offer of proof that Schnapp would
testify that he spoke with Schuhmacher immediately after the fire,
and Schuhmacher opined at that time that the fire originated in
the ceiling of the furnace room.166 Schnapp appealed the court’s
ruling on the basis that Schuhmacher was available for recall to ex-
plain or deny the inconsistent statement.167
Considering the text of Rule 613(b), as well as the accompanying
Advisory Committee’s Note, the Eighth Circuit explained that
under Rule 613(b), a witness’s prior inconsistent statement can be
introduced for impeachment before the witness is cross-examined
concerning the statement.168 Furthermore, this impeachment evi-
dence can be introduced “even if the witness is never afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the alleged statement.”169 The court,
nonetheless, concluded without explanation that admitting extrin-
sic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement after the available
witness has been excused is optional; a district court is not required
to do so.170
165. Id.
166. Id. at 569–70.
167. Id. at 570.
168. Id. at 571 (noting that Rule 613(b) does not require the cross-examination of a wit-
ness about an inconsistent statement to occur prior to the statement being introduced as
evidence for impeachment).
169. Id. at 571.
170. Id. at 571–72 (relying on United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir.
1994)). The court in Schnapp relied heavily on its previous decision in United States v. Sutton,
41 F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1994), as have other courts imposing the requirement of a prior
foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Schnapp,
322 F.3d at 571; see, e.g., United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 1997) (relying
on Sutton’s interpretation of Rule 613(b) to require a prior foundation).
Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit in Sutton failed to interpret the text or Advisory Com-
mittee’s Note of Rule 613(b) in determining that trial courts have discretion to impose the
prior foundation requirements of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, despite the plain
meaning of Rule 613(b). Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257. In that case, the defendant, Eugene Sutton,
appealed from the trial court’s exclusion of a witness presenting extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement attributed to the government’s key witness, Mr. Smith. Id. at 1260. The
trial court based its decision on the fact that defense counsel did not confront Mr. Smith with
the inconsistency on cross-examination. Id. The Eighth Circuit recognized that Rule 613(b)
had “relaxed” the requirement of a prior foundation but noted that this “relaxed” procedure
“is not mandatory, but is optional at the trial judge’s discretion.” Id. The court continued,
“[S]ince this circuit has never adopted the rule in Barrett, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in not applying it.” Id. The problem with this reasoning, however, is that
Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement of a prior foundation, whether the Eighth Circuit
had previously adopted it or not. Thus, the decision in Schnapp is undermined by the court’s
reliance on the weak reasoning of Sutton.
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In addition to cases like Schnapp, which cite to unidentified dis-
cretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement properly introduced under Rule 613(b), other federal
courts of appeals have similarly upheld exclusion, but under Rule
611(a) and Rule 403.171 Some courts have found the basis for ex-
cluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
grounded in a court’s discretion under Rule 611(a)172 to exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of examining wit-
nesses and presenting evidence to avoid wasting time and to protect
the witness from harassment and undue embarrassment.173 Other
courts cite the discretion afforded by Rule 403’s caveat that even
relevant evidence may be excluded if, for example, the evidence
will confuse the jury.174 Still other courts have affirmed the exclu-
sion of such evidence by steadfastly maintaining the prior
foundation requirements of common law in direct contravention of
Rule 613(b)’s plain language.175 None of these rationales is sound.
171. E.g., United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 956 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Marks, 816 F.2d 1207, 1210–11 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Alvarez, No. 91 CR 279-5,
1991 WL 259008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1991) (citing Marks, 816 F.2d at 1207); see also, e.g.,
PARK & LININGER, supra note 6; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 57 (“[W]here the potential costs
of abandoning the traditional approach are high, the courts and commentators conclude
there is power under Rule 611(a) to require the impeaching party to adhere to the tradi-
tional approach or risk exclusion of the prior inconsistent statement under Rule 403.”
(citations omitted)).
172. Rule 611(a) provides:
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasonable con-
trol over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so
as to:
(1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
173. E.g., Hudson, 970 F.2d at 956 n.2 (maintaining that Rule 613(b) does not require
prior opportunity to explain or deny, but noting that Rule 611(a) does give trial courts dis-
cretion to require prior foundation “when such an approach seems fitting”); see also PARK &
LININGER, supra note 6 (trial court has discretion under Rule 611(a), as well as Advisory Com-
mittee’s Note, to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the prior
foundation was not laid).
174. E.g., Marks, 816 F.2d at 1210–11 (affirming trial court’s decision disallowing extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent statement to avoid jury confusion); Alvarez, 1991 WL 259008,
at *2 (citing Marks, 816 F.2d at 1210–11, in requiring impeaching party to first show extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent statement to witness to prevent jury confusion); see also, e.g.,
FISHMAN, supra note 75; PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
175. E.g., Dierling, 131 F.3d at 733 (“Rule 613(b) allows impeachment by prior inconsis-
tent statement only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to explain the
statement.”); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that,
under Rule 613(b), “before a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced, the party mak-
ing the statement must be given the opportunity to explain or deny the same.”); United
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Courts that impose a prior foundation requirement without ex-
planation appear to do so in obvious disregard for the plain
meaning of the Rule and the drafters’ intent. In United States v.
Dierling, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the trial court refusing to allow
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the wit-
ness was not first given an opportunity to explain the
inconsistency.176 In that case, the defendant Mark Perkins was con-
victed of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine.177 At issue was the admissi-
bility of the report of a DEA agent to impeach Michelle Crawford, a
government witness.178 The report contained the agent’s account of
his interview with Ms. Crawford, wherein she stated that Mr. Perkins
had killed Danny Craig and told her that he fed his body to some
hogs.179 Despite possessing this report during the cross-examination
of Ms. Crawford, the Defendant never mentioned it.180 When the
Defendant attempted to introduce the report during the testimony
of the DEA agent who created it, the trial court excluded the re-
port.181 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court,
providing no explanation other than the inaccurate statement that
“Rule 613(b) allows impeachment by prior inconsistent statement
only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to explain the
statement.”182 This is in clear contravention of the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 613(b), which relaxes the requirement that the
witness be provided the opportunity to explain the prior inconsis-
tent statement before being impeached with it.183
Claims that a court has discretion pursuant to Rule 611(a) to ex-
clude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that
otherwise conforms to Rule 613(b) are similarly weak.184 The Advi-
sory Committee drafted Rule 613(b) fully aware of the discretion
States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming decision to exclude extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent statement where witness was not first asked about inconsis-
tency on cross-examination).
176. Dierling, 131 F.3d at 733.
177. Id. at 728.





183. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
184. In Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., for example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the trial court excluding extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent state-
ment where the witness was not first permitted to explain or deny the statement. The Seventh
Circuit found it was within the trial court’s discretion to control the mode and order of
examinations and evidence under Rule 611(a). 847 F.2d 1261, 1276 (7th Cir. 1988).
WINTER 2014] Sweet Caroline 311
conferred by Rule 611(a);185 if it had intended that a court would
exercise such discretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of prior in-
consistent statements, it would not have bothered with 613(b). The
Advisory Committee recognized that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case saves time but chose to adopt Rule 613(b) anyway.186 If it had
thought that Rule 611(a), which specifically cites time-saving as a
reason for disregarding many rules of evidence, could prevent the
application of Rule 613(b), it would never have written Rule 613(b)
at all; time-saving could be cited to defeat every attempt to enforce
Rule 613(b). Since the Advisory Committee enacted Rule 613(b), it
clearly contemplated that a court would not exercise the discretion
of Rule 611(a) to defeat the Rule.
The discretion of Rule 403 is an equally invalid justification for
imposing a prior foundation requirement on the introduction of
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. In United States
v. Marks, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a ruling of the trial court requiring the Defendant
to show multiple witnesses a particular form from which defense
counsel was reading before impeaching them with it.187 The court
noted that Rule 613(b) specifically abolished the traditional foun-
dation requirement of the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case.188
Nonetheless, the court determined that the trial judge was within
his discretion when he insisted that the witnesses be given a chance
to explain or deny the statements before being impeached with
them in order to prevent jury confusion.189 The court noted that it
would be inappropriate for a court to choose to apply the common
law rule instead of Rule 613. Nonetheless, the court suggested that
a trial judge “is entitled to conclude that in particular circum-
stances the older approach should be used in order to avoid
confusing witnesses and jurors.”190
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois also
relied on Rule 403 to invalidate Rule 613(b) in United States v. Alva-
rez.191 In that case, the court required defense counsel to first show
the witness the FBI reports counsel intended to use to impeach him
185. See generally Scallen, supra note 71, at 602–09 (discussing the historical context within
which the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted).
186. See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 255 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Rules of Evi-
dence (Supplement): Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74-75 (1973) (statement of Edward W. Cleary, Re-
porter, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S.)).
187. 816 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1987).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1211.
190. Id.
191. No. 91 CR 279-5, 1991 WL 259008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1991).
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where counsel was “waving the FBI reports in front of the jury while
walking directly in front of them, and was reading extensive
passages from those reports.”192 The court relied on the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Marks to support its decision, in-
cluding that court’s reasoning that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s
Case may be appropriate, despite Rule 613, to avoid confusing the
jury.193
Such opinions wrongly suggest that a court’s discretion under
Rule 403 could render Rule 613 inapplicable. The discretion of
Rule 403 is even broader than that of Rule 611(a).194 For the rea-
sons explained above, a court should not exercise that discretion to
exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to save
time.195 Nonetheless, there are certainly limited situations where
the exercise of Rule 403 could be appropriate to exclude prior in-
consistent statements, but only on a basis other than saving time.196
C. A Middle Ground: The Unique Approach of the Third Circuit
Unlike those courts applying Rule 613(b) as written,197 courts im-
posing the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case under any analysis
typically do so without determining that the witness is unavailable
for recall.198 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, however, has taken a different approach altogether. Like the
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id. at *2 n.2.
194. Rule 403 provides:
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or
Other Reasons
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that
impeaching attorney waving papers around while questioning about a prior inconsistent
statement before introducing the prior statement confused the jury); Alvarez, 1991 WL
259008, at *2 (requiring impeaching attorney to show prior statement to witness before con-
tinuing cross-examination because counsel’s actions of waving papers around and reading
from them caused jury confusion).
197. See supra note 113.
198. See supra note 157; see, e.g., United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 571–72 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 733 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sutton, 41
F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir.
1989); Marks, 816 F.2d at 1211; United States v. Elliott, 771 F.2d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 1985).
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courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, the Third Circuit recognizes that Rule 613(b) imposes no
prior foundation requirement.199 Like the Second, Fourth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits, however, the Third Circuit excludes extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the proponent of
the evidence has not confronted the declarant with the statement
on cross-examination and has not later recalled the available declar-
ant to explain or deny the statement.200 The difference in the Third
Circuit’s approach is that, like those courts that do not require a
prior foundation, the Third Circuit considers the availability of the
declarant witness for recall after the court has excused him.201 But,
unlike the other circuits that follow Rule 613(b), the Third Circuit
puts the burden of recalling the witness to provide an opportunity
to explain or deny the inconsistency on the proponent, rather than
the opponent, of the prior inconsistent statement.202
Although at odds with the majority of circuit courts, which place
the burden of recall on the opponent of a prior inconsistent state-
ment,203 the Third Circuit’s approach is in harmony with the text of
Rule 613(b). Specifically, Rule 613(b) states that extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible “if the witness is given
an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse
party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it.”204
The Rule is silent as to which party has the burden to provide the
witness the opportunity to explain or deny the statement.205 None-
theless, that burden is juxtaposed with the opportunity to examine
the witness specifically provided to the opponent of the evidence.
Read in context, the Rule implies that the party other than the op-
ponent of the evidence—namely, the proponent of the evidence—
bears the responsibility of allowing the witness to explain or deny
the inconsistent statement. Although this interpretation of Rule
613(b) is at odds with the majority of circuit courts, it is an equally
valid interpretation.
But see Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1522–23 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming exclu-
sion of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement where impeaching attorney failed
to confront witness with inconsistency on cross-examination because witness was unavailable
for recall).
199. E.g., United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. De-
Laurentis, 47 F. App’x 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2002).
200. E.g., Green, 556 F.3d at 158; DeLaurentis, 47 F. App’x at 172.
201. E.g., Green, 556 F.3d at 158; DeLaurentis, 47 F. App’x at 172.
202. E.g., Green, 556 F.3d at 158; DeLaurentis, 47 F. App’x at 172.
203. See supra note 113.
204. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
205. Id.
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Ultimately, federal circuit courts are torn in their application of
Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). A majority applies the Rule in
accordance with its plain meaning and the drafters’ intent.206 A mi-
nority holds fast to the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case.207 Still another court applies a unique, but
valid, interpretation all its own that lies somewhere between the two
competing interpretations.208
IV. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SHOULD ENFORCE RULE 613(b)
AS ORIGINALLY ENACTED
The circuit split among U.S. courts of appeals over whether the
Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case remains applicable209 is an obstacle
to the uniform application of Rule 613(b).210 Yet, the obstacle to
uniform application is not found in the Rule itself, and thus should
not cause the Advisory Committee to amend the rule. The Advisory
Committee Evidence Rules instituted a philosophy in 1994 that it
would not amend a rule “absent a showing either that it is not work-
ing well in practice or that it embodies an erroneous policy
decision.”211 The Advisory Committee explained that any amend-
ment in the Rules of Evidence “‘will create new uncertainties as to
interpretation and unexpected problems in practical applica-
tion.’”212 There is no evidence that Rule 613(b) does not work well
when applied according to its plain meaning; there is no ambiguity
in its terms. Rather, Rule 613(b) does not work well when ignored
by courts and supplanted with an archaic common law rule.
Between Rule 613(b) and the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, it
is the common law rule that embodies an erroneous policy deci-
sion. After all, this was a rule developed to suit the needs of a King
seeking to divorce his wife, unconcerned that she might receive a
death sentence as a result.213 The objection that resulted in the
Rule had no applicability to the context in which it was made be-
cause the prior inconsistent statements were not offered for the
206. See supra Part III.A.
207. See supra Part III.B.
208. See supra Part III.C.
209. See supra note 112.
210. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
211. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655,
1680 (1995).
212. Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2)(D) (proposed amendments)).
213. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
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truth of the matter asserted.214 Because that objection was so un-
timely, the most worthy argument against the court’s ruling —that
to show the witness the extrinsic evidence before confronting her
with it would disable the impeaching attorney’s ability to effectively
discredit her—was never made since it was, by that time, moot.215
The court that created the Rule did so after only ten minutes of
deliberation and relied on no precedent.216 England recognized
that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case was erroneous shortly after
the Rule became law, and it abandoned the Rule thirty-four years
later.217
Meanwhile, the policy reasons behind the Advisory Committee’s
thoughtfully drafted Rule 613(b) remain valid. The element of sur-
prise in impeachment is still useful in a jury’s assessment of the
declarant witness’s credibility and, thus, remains an important tool
in the trial lawyer’s toolbox.218 Concern for fairness to opposing
counsel is mitigated by Rule 613(a)’s requirement that the im-
peaching attorney provide a copy of an inconsistent statement to
opposing counsel upon request.219 Similarly, Rule 613(b) satisfies
the concern for fairness to the witness by requiring that the witness
be given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency at some
point.220 Moreover, concern for a witness’s embarrassment at being
confronted with a prior inconsistent statement supported by evi-
dence available to opposing counsel221 misses the mark; one should
be more concerned with the jury’s ability to assess that witness’s
credibility. Finally, the amount of time saved by avoiding recalling
the declarant witness is not so significant to outweigh the benefits
of allowing the jury to witness the confrontation in whatever dra-
matic way counsel chooses. At the very least, there is no reason to
believe that time-saving has decreased since the Advisory Commit-
tee drafted the Rule in 1969.
If the Advisory Committee feels strongly that some action must
be taken, it should do so with the aim of promoting enforcement
of, rather than drastically altering, the current rule. This could be
accomplished by revising Rule 613(b) in two ways.
214. See supra note 39.
215. See supra notes 39–42.
216. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Broadhead, supra note 37, at 252; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 167;
Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, § 24 (Eng.).
218. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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First, the Advisory Committee could amend Rule 613(b) to in-
clude the witness’s availability directly in the text of the rule itself.
The Committee need not look further than Rule 804(a) for a useful
definition of “unavailability.”222 For hearsay purposes, a declarant is
unavailable as a witness in five distinct circumstances.223 The first
type of unavailable witness exists where the court holds that an ap-
plicable privilege exempts the witness from testifying about the
statement at issue.224 Next is the witness who refuses to testify about
the statement despite a court order to do so.225 The third category
of unavailable witnesses includes those who testify that they cannot
remember the statement at issue.226 Another type of unavailable wit-
ness includes those who have died or suffer from a physical or
mental illness that prevents them from physically appearing in
court.227 Finally, a witness is unavailable where attempts to require
his attendance through legal process have failed.228 Of course, even
if one of the aforementioned circumstances exists, a witness is not
unavailable where his absence was caused by the proponent of the
statement in an attempt to prevent the witness from appearing.229
By including the definition of unavailability from Rule 804(a) in
Rule 613(b), the Advisory Committee can eliminate whatever con-
fusion exists concerning the significance of a witness’s availability
for recall. Specifically, the Advisory Committee could amend Rule
613(b) as follows:
Rule 613. Witness’s Prior Statement
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Ex-
trinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is
admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to ex-
plain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an
opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so
requires. This subdivision (b) is satisfied regardless of the timing of
the witness’s opportunity to explain or deny the statement where the
witness is not unavailable for recall as defined under Rule 804(a).
This subdivision (b) does not apply to an opposing party’s
statement under Rule 801(d)(2).
222. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
223. Id.
224. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
225. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
226. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
227. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
228. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
229. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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Such a change does no more than the Rule currently does, but it
eliminates the confusion of some courts as to whether following the
Advisory Committee Note is mandatory or permissive. Such an
amendment makes it clear that the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case
is not the law in federal courts and has not been for some time.
Second, the Advisory Committee could consider adding an Advi-
sory Committee Note limiting the exercise of a court’s discretion to
exceptional circumstances concerning the timing for laying the
foundation required for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement. Specifically, for the reasons explained
in Part III.B of this Article, the drafters of Rule 613(b) did not in-
tend that a court could undermine the effectiveness of Rule 613(b)
by applying the discretion of Rule 611(a).230 A new Advisory Com-
mittee Note could provide as follows:
Subdivision (b). The original drafters of Rule 613(b) recog-
nized that the Rule of Evidence marked a departure from the
prior time-saving foundation requirement of the common law
Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case. Rule 613(b), thus, represents a
conscious decision to accept a less time-efficient alternative
over an unnecessary common law rule. Courts applying Rule
613(b), therefore, should use caution in exercising the discre-
tion provided to them under Rules 611(a) or 403 to achieve
saving time because that policy goal is outweighed by the coun-
tervailing policy goals motivating the drafters of Rule 613(b).
If a court were to use the discretion of Rules 611(a) or 403 to
require a common law prior foundation to achieve saving
time, Rule 613(b) could be avoided in every circumstance.
The court’s discretion under Rules 611(a) and 403 otherwise
remains in full effect.
An Advisory Committee Note to this effect should cause courts to
pause before requiring the prior foundation of Queen Caroline’s
Case in order to achieve saving time.
There is one legitimate criticism of Rule 613(b) as currently
drafted: it fails to identify which party is responsible for providing
the witness an opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent
statement after it is introduced.231 The Advisory Committee could
amend the Rule to specify whether the proponent or the opponent
of the evidence must provide that opportunity. However, the disa-
greement over which party bears this burden is more in the nature
230. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
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of a true circuit split, rather than a misinterpretation of a rule of
evidence. It is therefore best left for the Supreme Court to resolve,
should that body be interested in the matter.
CONCLUSION
The Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case has a fascinating history, but
its time for use in federal practice has long since faded. Rule 613(b)
is an effective rule that accomplishes nearly all of the goals of the
common law rule without impeding cross-examination. The only
problem with Rule 613(b) is the refusal of a minority of courts to
enforce it as plainly written. The Advisory Committee should not
consider amending the Rule, which a majority of U.S. courts of ap-
peals follow, to accommodate the weak interpretation of a few
courts. The Advisory Committee should take no action concerning
Rule 613(b). However, should the Committee feel compelled to ad-
dress the circuit split with an amendment to the Rule, it should act
to strengthen the enforcement of Rule 613(b) as its drafters in-
tended and as courts have applied it for over thirty-five years.
